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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The Failure of the State to Give Notice of the Charge of Theft 
Sufficient to Allow Preparation of a Defense is Structural Error that 
Requires Vacation of Both Convictions. 
1. The State is Mistaken in its Argument that Ms. 
Berreman-Garcia Waived her State and Federal 
Constitutional Rights to Due Process 
In its brief, the State argues that Ms. Herreman-Garcia waived any due 
process challenges to the Information by not objecting in the district court. 
Respondent's Brief pp. 4-9. This argument is contrary to the record. 
In the district court, the defense objected to the lack of notice sufficient to 
allow preparation of a defense as soon as the State asked Mr. Munoz a question 
relating to the paychecks issued to Ms. Herreman-Garcia. The State argued its 
position that it was not required to give notice and the district court ruled on the 
objection. As recorded in the transcript: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I'm going to lodge a general 
objection to these questions. I don't see the relevance. 
THE COURT: What's the legal basis of your objection? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The relevance to the charge, Your Honor, 
asking about time sheets, other checks. I don't see where we are even 
within the realm of relevance to the charges that are listed in the 
Information. 
THE COURT: Well, it's my understanding it would relate to Count I. 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And Count I is theft of cash, so I don't 
understand how -
1 
THE COURT: That's not how Count I is framed. It is framed as in 
excess of $1000, so the objection is overruled. This docs appear to be 
relevant to the issues raised by Count I. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All right. 
THE COURT: As well as Count II. The earlier testimony related to 
Court I. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Why is that? Maybe I'm misinterpreting. 
THE COURT: Please continue. 
Tr. p. 132, ln. 24-p. 133, ln. 22. 
Moments later, defense counsel again attempted to object to an exhibit 
relating to pay records. The court stopped the objection on the basis that it was 
premature since the exhibit had not been yet offered. The following transpired: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm going to have a very big objection coming 
up. 
THE COURT: All right. I will be waiting for it. 
Tr. p. 134, ln. 20-23. 
When the State offered the exhibit, defense counsel made the objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now would be an appropriate time for your large 
objection. [Court excused the jury] .... All right state your objection. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, I suppose I can see what's 
going on. It appears to me to be a very big bait and switch by the 
prosecution. 
When we were at preliminary hearing, we had evidence put on on the 
grand theft charge that included cash withdrawals that were made 
through the use of an ATM card, and then we had proof of the two 
checks which are alleged to have been forged. 
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There was no proof put on at preliminary, and I have the copy of the 
transcript here, that even touched on the subject of falsified time cards 
and other checks that were being falsified in the business. 
So I see now that the information says, 'did wrongfully take cash' but 
in reality, what's going on is these time cards, and I'm objecting based 
on relevance is, that they really do not go to the point of what we saw 
in the preliminary hearing, which is the use of the ATM card for cash 
withdrawals and the forgery of the two checks. 
These time cards are an entirely separate manner of theft, so I would 
make a general relevance objection, and I think if what the State is 
trying to do is offering this as perhaps a -
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I think your interpretation is a bit 
narrow. But I will certainly allow counsel to address the argument 
that somehow there is additional charges or material presented. I 
don't know what-
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, it's a general relevance objection, because 
there - if there is a theft going on here, it is an entirely different type 
of theft than was put on at preliminary, and so that, I think, is a 
complete surprise today as we stand here, and I believe the record 
completely bears that out at preliminary. 
I will also state a 404(b) objection, because I think of what's going on 
here is a presentation of propensity evidence. I have not received any 
notice from the State that they intended to put on propensity evidence 
to try to prove conformity to any kind of a - you know, any type of a 
pattern of conduct here. 
And as well, if this is - if it's found to be relevant to the charges of 
what was presented at preliminary and they can overcome the 404(b), I 
think as well it's extremely prejudicial, and 403 should hold it out as 
well. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
So how do you respond to the objection as to relevance and as to - well, 
if it's 404(b), and the assertion that this is somehow changing the 
structure of the case? 
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[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, all of the documents that have been 
offered here in Exhibit No. 1 have been made available to the defense 
from the inception of the case. 
These issues of these checks were addressed in the police report that 
[was] provided to defense in the discovery. It was very clear from the 
police report that the issue of these checks related to the charge of 
grand theft that had been brought against the defendant. 
While it may be true that the evidence at preliminary hearing did not 
touch directly upon these checks, there was plenty of evidence 
submitted in -regarding the use of the debit card and the forgery of 
the checks and theft also of the forged checks. 
The State is under no obligation to put on its entire case at the 
preliminary hearing. We are, of course, only required to put on enough 
evidence to satisfy the magistrate that there is probable cause that the 
defendant committed the crime she's accused of. 
We are not required to put on all of the evidence that we have, and we 
are certainly free within, you know, the confines of discovery and 
obviously a fair trial, to put on a broader scope of evidence at trial than 
we put on in the preliminary hearing. 
That's common practice. That's allowed under the law, and this does 
not expand or surprise the defense in any way. I don't see how this 
could possibility surprise the defense. 
THE COURT: And so you are saying that all these documents have 
been previously provided to the defense in discovery? 
[PROSECUTOR]: That's correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And they are also referenced in the police reports? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if I may respond. 
As far as 404(b) is concerned. I would direct the -
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THE COURT: Counsel, I don't think - the first issue is whether it's 
relevant, because if it's relevant and this is properly before the court, it 
doesn't even raise a 404(b) issue. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes. If this is - if what they are trying to do 
is charge her with theft through time card violations, then yes, Your 
Honor, I would agree with the court there. 
And maybe it's a good thing that we are at the end of today, because I 
think - I think maybe a careful review of the preliminary hearing will 
show that - and I think basically counsel did so much admit that there 
really wasn't any evidence of the time card violation or time card fraud 
being put on at all in the preliminary hearing. 
So when I look at the crime of taking an ATM card, going to an ATM, 
and withdrawing cash wrongfully and forging a check, those are 
entirely different things than actually falsifying a time card and 
getting money out of my employer that way. 
I would also say that there is this whole concept later on in the - of a 
unifying plan, which is mentioned in State verus Bussard, 114 Idaho 
781, which is talking about how - which is how - if there is a unifying 
plan, you can group things together, but where is the unified plan? 
Versus -ATM card theft versus time card theft, those are two different 
things. And, Your Honor, my client simply has not had an opportunity 
to vet this at preliminary. It was not vetted at all, so I think as much 
as the prosecution wants to say -
THE COURT: But you don't deny that you were provided the 
information? You are saying this was not presented at the preliminary 
hearing. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Oh, certainly, I had the information, Your 
Honor, but I have been under the understanding this entire time that 
what was going to be presented at trial was what was presented -
would come under the plan that was presented at the preliminary 
hearing, which is use of the ATM card for cash, and use of the - the 
forgery of the checks. 
And I will briefly mention the 404(b) if we find it's not relevant. 
404(b), I would direct the court to State versus Whitaker 152 Idaho 
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945, which says that even though the documents are published in 
discovery, notice requirement of Subsection Bis mandatory, and a 
failure to comply creates a complete bar to admissibility. 
And the entire point of it is, is to provide the other side - to provide the 
defense with an opportunity to know how they are going to use that 
evidence so that they can rebut it, and there hasn't been any notice 
provided. 
THE COURT: Further response? 
[PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I just don't know - I don't quite know 
how to respond to that, Your Honor, quite frankly. 
We are not required to give the defendant an itemized notice of exactly 
how we intend to prove all of the charges that we have brought. 
He has been put on notice through discovery of the scope of evidence 
that we have. It's abundantly clear from the police reports that were 
provided to defense that the issue of these, of checks - and we haven't 
fully brought this out for the court, so I know it's not entirely clear in 
the record exactly what we are talking about. 
We are not talking about falsification of time cards here. We are 
talking about excess payments, additional checks that she was not 
entitled to that she was issuing to herself. 
That's the allegation, Your Honor, so those were all issues that were 
raised in the police report and through the police report through 
discovery, the defense has been put on notice of the charges and 
allegations that we have brought. 
Simply because we haven't addressed all of the scope, the full scope of 
the State's evidence at the preliminary hearing does not preclude those 
from now presenting that at trial. 
This is not a 404(b) issue. This is directly relevant to the charge in 
Count I. 
[DEFENSE COUNSELJ: I just have one final thought, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: My client does have a right to meet these at 
preliminary and to confront them. We chose to exercise that right, and 
all that was presented was the ATM usage and the two checks. 
And I think if this is deemed to be relevant to something now, it's a 
complete change of the charge, and she is being basically denied her 
right to confront this at preliminary. Thank you. 
If I may, too, I don't see the prejudice on the State's side, Your Honor. 
If there was a separate issue, I think it could be brought up in separate 
proceedings. 
Tr. p. 136, ln. 24-p. 145, ln. 17. 
The next morning the court made its ruling: 
THE COURT: I have reviewed Exhibit 1. I also reviewed the 
preliminary hearing transcript. And the purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is simply to determine if there is probable cause to bind the 
defendant over to stand trial. 
I have looked - I have reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, 
and there is reference in the preliminary hearing, which was held on 
July 17, 2014, so well more than a month after the disclosure of this 
information. 
And there's clear reference on the in the preliminary hearing 
transcript to the double paycheck. 
But the only purpose of a preliminary hearing and that's on page 45 
of the preliminary hearing transcript, where there's a specific reference 
to the double paychecks. 
Under Idaho law, when an Information properly alleges each and every 
element of an offense, it is sufficient - Idaho pleading requirements 
require than an Information be a concise and plain statement of the 
charge. 
Specifically, the Indictment or Information shall be a plain, concise, 
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the 
offense charged, and that is Idaho Criminal Rule 7(13). 
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Rule 12 requires that if a party - if the defense contends that there is a 
deficiency with the pleading, that it be raised prior to trial under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 12. 
But this Information alleges all material elements of the offense, and it 
meets the standards of Idaho law for pleading purposes. 
I also reviewed State versus Severson, 14 7 Idaho 694, which has a 
really good discussion about the fact that the means by which an 
offense is committed is not essential, provided that the Information 
contains the elements - all material elements of the offense, which it 
does. 
And I do not find the objection well-founded. The objection is 
overruled. And counsel may proceed to address these matters. 
There has been ample time since June 4th to review all these matters, 
either - looking at Exhibit 1 is quite straightforward. I looked at it 
myself. It's quite straightforward and clearly alerts anyone who looks 
at it to the same issue that was referenced in the preliminary hearing, 
that is, the double paychecks. 
And so I think the objection is not well-founded. It's overruled, and 
counsel will be allowed to proceed. So let's bring in the jury and 
continue. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, if I just may make a just a quick 
- and I know this is kind of a motion to reconsider, but there is some 
verbiage on the last couple page of the preliminary transcript 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'm not going to visit it at this time. That's my 
ruling. I allowed a lot of discussion for it. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well-
THE COURT: And I read the entire prelim last night, and so I'm not -
once I rule, then we will move on. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, the reason is, is I posed that exact 
question to Judge Gardunia, and I said, 'What exactly is it that's being 
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bound over?' 1 
i At the preliminary hearing, the following was stated: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Just so I'm clear, Your Honor, so the Count I 
and the Count II are concerning the two checks, the 5008 and the 581; 
is that correct? 
THE COURT: No, I did not understand that that was the State's 
evidence that that was solely related - Count I was solely related to 
the checks. My understanding is that Count I included the allegation 
of use of the card. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 
THE COURT: And money taken out of the ATM as well as 
unauthorized purchases. My understanding was that encompassed all 
of that. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. And then -
THE COURT: And I find the evidence supports that. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. For the two checks and the ATMs, and 
then the - in Count II, same thing. 
THE COURT: I believe, if I'm correct, that the State is alleging under 
Count II just simply the forgery, and under Count I, the entire theft, 
including all of the allegations that have been made with respect to the 
cashing of the checks, taking of money from the ATMs and the 
unauthorized purchases on the debit cards. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. 
THE COURT: Is that correct, [prosecuting attorney]? 
[PROSECUTOR]: That's correct, Your Honor. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. I wanted to make sure of that. Thank 
you, Your Honor. 
Prelim. Tr. p. 89, ln. 10-p. 90, ln. 13. 
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THE COURT: The means is not required to be detailed in the 
Information. The only purpose of the preliminary hearing is to 
determine if there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been 
committed and that the Defendant is the one who committed. 
You were provided the information which has been disclosed to you for 
a considerable period of time, so the objection is not well-founded. 
Exhibit 1 is admitted, and we will proceed. 
Tr. p. 14 7, In. 13-p. p. 150, In. 18. 
These transcripts demonstrate that Ms. Herreman-Garcia did object to the 
lack of notice in the Information as to the charges to be faced, that the State 
acknowledged this objection by arguing that it did not have to give notice of the 
means, and that the district court specifically ruled that the Information was 
sufficient. The State's argument on appeal that there was no objection below is 
inconsistent with the record. 
Furthermore, the State's insistence that Ms. Herreman-Garcia waived her 
state and federal constitutional rights to notice of the charges against her is 
contrary to the long-established doctrine that waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights is not presumed from a silent record. Johnson u. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 
58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023 (1938), stating that courts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and do not 
presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. See also, Smith u. State, 
146 Idaho 822, 834, 203 P.3d 1221, 1233, ftnt. 11 (2009), noting that waiver is a 
voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage and that there 
is a presumption against wavier of fundamental constitutional rights. 
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Even if defense counsel in this case had not objected to the lack of notice as to 
charges faced, the State had not acknowledged the objection, and the district 
court had not ruled on the objection, the record is devoid of any voluntary, 
intentional relinquishment of a right to notice of the charges being leveled by the 
State. Contrary to the State's argument on appeal, Ms. Berreman-Garcia never 
voluntarily and intentionally relinquished her right to notice of the charges. U.S. 
Const. Amends. 5 and 14; Idaho Const. Art. I, §13. 
The State does acknowledge that the defense made an objection, but asserts 
that this was an objection on the basis of a variance. Respondent's Brief p. 7. A 
variance arises when the proof offered at trial departs from the allegations in the 
indictment or information. State u. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 565-66, 861 P.2d 1225, 
1230-31 (Ct. App. 1993). Variances are fatal when they affect the substantial rights 
of the accused. Id. These substantial rights include the right to due process notice 
of the charge and protection from another prosecution for the same offense. State u. 
Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 416-17, 716 P.2d 1182, 1188-89 (1985). The State appears 
to argue that an objection to a lack of due process based upon the lack of notice of 
the charge and an objection based upon a variance which has resulted in a lack of 
due process because of a lack of notice of the charge are different objections and that 
this difference has some import in this case. But, its argument makes no sense. 
The objections are the same - that the Information did not provide adequate notice 
so as to allow the accused to prepare a meaningful defense and be protected against 
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jeopardy. State u. Windsor, supra; State u. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58, 101 
699, 701-02 (2004); State u. Banks, 113 Idaho 54, 58, 740 P.2d 1039, 1043 
(Ct.App. 1987).2 
The State also argues that if the objection is an objection based upon a lack of 
notice creating a due process violation, that the objection could only be raised prior 
to trial, pursuant to ICR 12(b)(2). Subsection (d) establishes the deadlines for filing 
- 28 days after entry of a plea of not guilty or 7 days before trial, whichever is 
earlier. The subsection further allows the court to shorten or enlarge the time 
deadlines, and "for good cause shown, or for excusable neglect, may relieve a party 
of failure to comply with this rule." In this case, the district court did not deny Ms. 
Herreman-Garcia's motion because it was untimely, nor did the State object to the 
timeliness of the motion. It is only now, for the first time on appeal, that the State 
is raising a timeliness challenge. However, the district court was correct in its 
determination to hear Ms. Herreman-Garcia's objection because there was good 
cause shown for not filing an objection to the Information prior to trial. At the 
preliminary hearing, the State told Ms. Herreman-Garcia and the court that the 
offense charged was theft of money by forging the Mittal and HOA checks, ATM 
withdrawals and unauthorized use of the debit card. As soon as the State altered 
2 Even if this Court were to find some merit in the State's argument that an 
objection based on lack of notice is not sufficient to preserve the issue of a fatal 
variance, the error is a fundamental error which can be raised for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 299 P.3d 788 (2013), holding that a variance 
between the charging document and the jury instructions was a fundamental error 
requiring that Day's conviction for lewd conduct with a minor be reversed. 
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course and sought conviction of theft also for falsification of payroll records and 
checks, Ms. Berreman-Garcia objected. The State cannot credibly argue that there 
was not good cause to allow the due process objection after the start of trial when it 
was the State's deception - whether deliberate or unintentional - in claiming one 
theft at the preliminary hearing and presenting proof of another at trial that led to 
the delay in objecting to the Information. 3 4 
The State's argument that Ms. Berreman-Garcia waived her state and 
federal constitutional due process rights to notice of the charge against her is 
contrary to the record and the law. 
2. Ms. Berreman-Garcia Has Shown a Due Process 
Violation 
The State argues that to show a due process violation, Ms. Berreman-Garcia 
has argued that prosecutors should ignore I.C. § 18-2409(1) and that she cannot 
make that argument now because she has not challenged the constitutionality of 
the statute. Respondent's Brief p. 10. The State is incorrect in both these 
assertions. 
3 The State cites to State u. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622, 115 P.3d 710, 713 
(2005), in support of its argument on appeal that the objection in the district court 
was untimely. However, that case concerned a motion for dismissal based upon a 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Information failed to include one of 
the elements of the crime. The motion was not made until after the State had 
rested. The Supreme Court held that the Information was sufficient to confer 
subject matter jurisdiction and reversed the district court order of dismissal. Ms. 
Herreman-Garcia is not raising a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
4 It is also of note that the State concedes in footnote 4 of its brief on page 23 
that issues of variances may not be addressable until trial. 
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Ms. Herreman-Garcia has not argued that prosecutors should ignore I.C. § 
18-2409(1). Rather, she noted that in State v. Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 928, 9~35 P.2d 
183, 192, ftnt. 8 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court of Appeals advised that to avoid the type 
of due process problem present in Ms. Herreman-Garcia's case, the prosecutor could 
ignore§ 18-2409(1) and insert language in the Information similar to that reviewed 
in State v. Darbin, 109 Idaho 516, 518-19, 708 P.2d 921, 923-24 (Ct. App. 1985), 
stating the way the defendant committed the alleged theft. There is nothing in 
Owen that requires those denied due process by lack of notice in the pleading attack 
the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-2409(1). 
Lastly, the State disputes that Ms. Herreman-Garcia did not have notice of 
its intent to rely upon four methods of theft to prove the charges against her: 1) 
misuse of the debit card; 2) paychecks paid for time not worked and/or duplicate 
paychecks; 3) unauthorized checks coming from A&A to her for no discernable 
reason; and 4) the misdirected Mittal and HOA checks. This dispute is inconsistent 
with the Information, the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing, and most 
disturbingly the prosecutor's assurance to defense counsel and the court at the 
preliminary hearing that Count I was based upon debit card purchases, ATM 
withdrawals and the misdirection of the Mittal and HOA checks. 
Finally, it is of note that the State has not argued that if there was a due 
process violation that it was not a structural error which requires vacation of the 
convictions of both Counts I and II. See Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 27-28; 
14 
Respondent's Brief at pages 4-13. 
3. Conclusion 
Ms. Herreman-Garcia's unwaived state and federal constitutional rights to 
due process were violated when the State failed to provide sufficient notice of the 
charge against her so that she could prepare and present a defense. This was a 
structural error that requires vacation of the convictions on both Count I and Count 
II. 
B. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error in Failing to 
Give Unanimity Instructions 
The State has argued, in reliance on Schad u. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 
S.Ct. 2491 (1991), that Ms. Herreman-Garcia was not entitled to a specific 
unanimity instruction in Count I because there was only one charge of grand theft 
and the various acts of theft the State provided evidence of were simply different 
means of committing the single charged theft. This argument is contrary to due 
process as explained in Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707 
(1999), a post-Schad case, and should be rejected. 
In Schad, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of 
whether it was constitutionally acceptable to permit a jury to reach one verdict 
based on any combination of alternative findings. Specifically, in Schad, the 
defendant was charged with first degree murder on the alternative theories of 
premeditated murder and felony murder. In a plurality opinion, the Supreme Court 
held that premeditated murder and felony murder were simply alternative means to 
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a common end - first degree murder - and thus, the jury did not have to 
unanimously agree on which alternative was the means by which the murder was 
committed. The Court's plurality stated that it was impossible to set out any single 
test for determining when two means are so disparate as to exemplify two 
inherently separate offenses. Rather, the concept of due process with its demands 
for fundamental fairness and for the rationality that is an essential component of 
that fairness, must serve as the measurement of the level of definitional and verdict 
specificity permitted by the Constitution. 501 U.S. at 637-38, 111 S.Ct. at 2500. 
Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence that the Constitution does limit a state's 
power to define crimes in ways that would permit juries to convict while disagreeing 
about the means. "We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging that 
the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Yon Wednesday." Schad, 501 U.S. 
at 651, 111 S.Ct. 2491 (Scalia, J., concurring.) 
Justice Scalia's comment above was quoted by the Supreme Court in 
Richardson v. United States, supra. In that case, a majority held that a jury must 
unanimously agree about which specific violations make up the "continuing series of 
violations" for purposes of a federal criminal statue which forbids any person from 
engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise where a continuing criminal enterprise 
involves a violation of the drug statutes when such violation is part of a continuing 
series of violations. 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(a) and (c). 526 U.S. at 815, 119 S.Ct. at 1709. 
The Court wrote that holding each "violation" amounts to a separate element is 
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consistent with the tradition of requiring juror unanimity where the issue is 
whether a defendant engaged in conduct that violates the law; that the statute's 
breadth argues against treating each individual violation as a means, for the 
breadth aggravates the dangers of unfairness that doing so would risk; and that the 
Constitution limits a state's power to define crimes in ways that would permit juries 
to convict while disagreeing about means, at least where that definition risks 
serious unfairness and lacks support in history or tradition. 526 U.S. at 819-20, 119 
S.Ct. at 1710-11. In reaching its holding, the Court specifically noted the likelihood 
that if violations were treated as means not requiring jury unanimity, the jury 
would be allowed to avoid discussion of the specific factual details of each violation 
covering up wide disagreement among the jurors about just what the defendant did 
or did not do and would aggravate the risk that jurors, unless required to focus upon 
specific factual detail, will fail to do so, simply concluding from testimony, say, of 
bad reputation, that where there is smoke there must be fire. 526 U.S. at 819, 119 
S.Ct. at 1711. It is worth noting that Richardson was decided just eight days prior 
to the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 981 P.3d 738 
(1999), a case cited by the state, and Richardson is not cited by the Nunez Court. To 
the extent Nunez is inconsistent with Schad and Richardson, it is not good law. 
The application of these principles to offenses like theft in which several 
transactions may be aggregated to constitute one violation requires a unanimity 
instruction when more than one of the underlying acts could constitute the crime on 
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own. Thus, in United States u. Newell, 658 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011), specific 
unanimity instructions were required for the counts of the indictment which alleged 
multiple fraudulent transactions as the basis for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 666 
prohibiting theft or bribery in programs receiving federal funds. See also, United 
States u. Holley, 942 U.S. 916, 928-29 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an indictment 
that charged counts of perjury on the basis of multiple statements required a 
specific unanimity instruction, as the "government was required to prove dissimilar 
facts to show the knowing falsity of each statement"); Bins u. United States, 331 
F.2d 390 393 (5th Cir. 1964) (noting that a two-count indictment, each count of 
which alleged multiple acts of uttering and publishing false documents in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1010, was duplicitous, as the filing of each false document would 
constitute a crime and should be alleged in a separate and distinct count of the 
indictment); United States u. Beras, 833 F.2d 455, 460-61 (3rd Cir. 1987) (holding 
that the unanimity requirement extends to an indictment for embezzling, stealing, 
abstracting, or converting union funds, that includes "several transactions or 
occurrences, any of which would constitute one of the acts proscribed by the charged 
statutes"); United States u. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 4 71 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding error 
in failure to give a unanimity instruction in a perjury case that all 12 jurors must 
unanimously agree that a particular material statement was falsely made). 
In Idaho, I.C. § 18-2407(b)(8) allows aggregation of a series of petit thefts to 
establish a count of grand theft. It provides: 
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Id. 
When any series of thefts, comprised of individual thefts having a 
value of one thousand dollars ($1000) or less, are part of a common 
scheme or plan, the thefts may be aggregated in one (1) count and the 
sum of the value of all the thefts shall be the value considered in 
determining whether the value exceeds one thousand dollars ($1000) 
In accord with Richardson, supra, due process requires that the jury agree 
unanimously on each of the petit thefts which are to be aggregated to prove the 
grand theft. 
But, in this case, not only was the jury presented with evidence of petit thefts 
which could be aggregated to establish Count I's charge of grand theft. It was also 
presented with proof of more than one grand theft (four to be precise - grand theft 
of the HOA check and three grand thefts of checks made out to Giselle Herreman or 
Giselle Gonzalez. See Tr. p. 564, ln. 1-16, where the State acknowledges that it 
included in its proof for Count I evidence as to both petit thefts that could be 
aggregated as well as multiple instances of grand theft that could have been 
charged as multiple counts.) In accord with Newell, supra; Holley, supra; Bins, 
supra; Beras, supra; and Fawley, supra, where more than one occurrence could 
constitute the charged crime, a unanimity instruction is required. As held in State 
u. Southwick, 158 Idaho 173, 181-82, 345 P.3d 232, 240-41 (Ct.App. 2014), when 
evidence is presented that the defendant has committed several temporally discrete 
acts, each of which would independently support a conviction for the crime charged, 
the trial court should instruct the jury that it must unanimously agree on the 
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specific incident constituting the offense in each count, regardless of whether the 
defendant requests such an instruction. Here, where there was evidence not only of 
multiple petit thefts which could be aggregated to establish grand theft, but also 
evidence of multiple grand thefts, the failure to give a specific unanimity instruction 
was error. 5 
With regard to Count I, Ms. Berreman-Garcia has shown that the failure to 
give a specific unanimity instruction violated her state and federal rights to due 
process. She has met the first prong of the Perry fundamental error analysis. State 
v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209. 226, 245 P.3d 961, 978 (2010). 
Ms. Berreman-Garcia has also shown that the error was clear or obvious 
without the need for reference to information not contained in the appellate record, 
the second prong of the Perry standard. Id. The State has argued that trial counsel 
had an incentive not to object to the error in order to avoid facing 59 counts of theft 
instead of 1. Respondent's Brief p. 19. However, counsel did in fact state that he 
believed that Ms. Berreman-Garcia should have been charged with multiple counts 
as opposed to a single count of grand theft and that the failure to charge multiple 
counts was prejudicial. Tr. p. 566, ln. 5-20. See also, State u. Sutton, 151 Idaho 
5 Compare the charge in this case with the 14 counts of grand theft charged 
in State v. Whittle, 145 Idaho 49, 175 P.3d 211 (Ct.App. 2007). Had the State 
charged this case the way it charged Whittle, it could have avoided the unanimity 
error. See also, State v. Gilbert, 112 Idaho 805, 809, 736 P.2d 857, 861 (Ct.App. 
1987), noting that the principle that separate thefts may be aggregated where 
evidence shows that all were part of a common scheme or plan applies only when 
aggregating several petit thefts into a grand theft. The rule cannot be used to 
aggregate several felony offenses into a single felony. ICJI 554 Comment. 
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161, 166-67, 254 P.2d 62, 67-68 (Ct. App. 2011), finding clear error despite the 
State's speculations about possible motives for defense counsel to not object in the 
absence of any indication that defense counsel knew more about the law than did 
the State or the court or any indication that counsel was attempting to sandbag the 
court. 
And, Ms. Herreman-Garcia has demonstrated prejudice, the third prong of 
the Perry standard. As set out in her Opening Brief, Ms. Herreman-Garcia had 
defenses to several of the alleged incidents of theft. There is a reasonable 
probability that not all the jurors agreed on any one instance of theft and that had 
they been properly instructed, the outcome of the trial would have been different. 
With regard to Count II, the State has admitted that the charge was 
duplicitous and created a due process error. Respondent's Brief p. 15, ftnt. 2. 
However, the State maintains that this error must be addressed prior to trial and is 
not a fundamental error. The State further argues that because it made a 
duplicitous charge, Ms. Herreman-Garcia cannot seek to cure it by means of a 
special unanimity instruction. Respondent's Brief pp. 22-24. These arguments 
should be rejected. 
While ICR 12(b)(2) does require that defense and objections based on defects 
in the information other than that it fails to show the jurisdiction of the court be 
raised before trial, a court may relieve a party of failure to comply with the rule and 
may grant relief from waiver. ICR 12(d) and (f). However, that is neither here nor 
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there for this appeal because ICR 12(b)(2) does not have anything whatsoever to do 
with the due process requirement of a specific unanimity instruction when the State 
presents evidence of more than one occurrence which could constitute the charged 
crime. Southwick, supra; Newell, supra; Holley, supra; Bins, supra; Beras, supra; 
Fawley, supra. 
The lack of a specific unanimity instruction on Count II was a due process 
error. Id. It was an unwaived error because there was no reason for Ms. Berreman 
to give the jury an opportunity to convict on less than a unanimous verdict. The 
evidence against her in Count II was not strong and trial counsel could have asked 
the court to require the state to elect one of the two crimes charged. Thus, the first 
prong of the fundamental error analysis is met. 
The error was clear or obvious without the need for reference to any 
additional evidence not contained in the appellate record because, as with Count I, 
there was no indication that defense counsel knew any more about the law than did 
the State and the court, and further there was no indication of any attempt to 
sandbag. Sutton, supra. Thus, the second prong of the fundamental error analysis 
is met. And, finally, there is a reasonable possibility that the alleged error affected 
the outcome of the trial proceedings because given the potential defenses to the 
charge, it is reasonably possible that not all jurors agreed that a particular forgery 
occurred. Thus, the third prong of the fundamental error analysis is met. 
In conclusion, the court did commit fundamental error in not giving a specific 
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unanimity instruction on both Counts I and II. On this basis, the convictions must 
be reversed. 
C. Objected to Euidentiary Errors Also Require Reversal 
Ms. Berreman-Garcia relies upon her Opening Brief to establish that 
objected to evidentiary errors also require reversal of the convictions and that the 
district court violated her state and federal constitutional rights to present a 
defense when it disallowed certain cross-examination of Mr. Antonio Ayon. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Both convictions must be vacated for structural error in failing to give 
required due process notice of the charge against Ms. Berreman-Garcia. They must 
also be reversed because of fundamental error in failing to give unanimity 
instructions. And, further, they must be reversed because of objected to evidentiary 
errors. Ms. Berreman-Garcia respectfully requests that this Court grant the 
required relief. . i:l: 
Submitted this Z1 day of January, 2016. 
~~ 
Attorneys for Ana Berreman-Garcia 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on Januar~q, 2016, I caused two true and correct copies of 




to: Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
D_wAIA:-S>L .,_,.:.-. 
Dennis Benjamin ' 
24 
